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Two cases of great importance show the evolution of court philosophy 
on the mores of the American people. It is often argued that the court has 
little to do with such inOuence and that the argument is e cOn/raria. that is. 
the court's ethical standards are determined by American mores - not vice 
versa. 
The following case study will attempt to show the opposite: people's 
mores are basically inOuenced by a moral choice of the court which tends 
to legitimatize forms of behavior in society under the rubric of "privacy." 
Th is has been particularly true in the area of sexual morality which is 
particularly susceptib le to every expansion of its exercise. There has never 
been any society which has not mandated sexua l restraint for a who le 
variety of reasons: religious. economic. patriarchial. etc . Our society. of 
course. is no exception. We have tended in the past 20 years to expand its 
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exercise to a whole variety of groups traditionally not of concern to the 
state: minors, homosexuals, the unmarried in general, the elderly and the 
handicapped . While there has been some controversy on the direction of 
this unfettering trend , the result of this has been the abortion decisions. 
Since many kinds of people now have a right to privacy in this intimate 
area (to have children or not), the consequence of this new sexual freedom 
had to end in the abortion movement because the ultimate assurance of 
this sexual right-privacy, is the ability to cut short the possible result of this 
activity (the child) which can interfere with the right (whether to have 
children or not while exercising the sexual right to privacy). 
Thus there is a whole network of inter-related rights which have flowed 
from what the court has determined to be a fundamental right: the right to 
engage in sexual activity (whether for married or unmarried , adults or 
minors) and its concomitant right whether to have children or not as a 
consequence of this activity (contraception, abortion). 
The real philosophical turn of events came with Eisenstadt v. Baird and 
not Roe v. Wade. Roe simply was the logical expansion of a sexual 
freedom given to each individual, whether to have a child or not 
(Eisenstadt). Logically, if contraceptives were to fail, then this right of 
privacy (whether to bear children or not) would be in imminent danger. To 
preserve the privacy right established in Eisenstadt, Roe had to find its 
own place in the penumbras of the Constitution which would solidify the 
more basic right of sexual choice. For, "whatever the rights of the 
individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same 
for the unmarried and married a like ." Why is this so? "lfthe right of privacy 
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free 
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally 
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 
In other words, the decision whether to give birth or not, belongs to the 
ind ividual and this, whether the person is married or not. Each individual 
has an inherent right of sexual privacy to control one's fertility in such a 
way that he or she may exercise it via contraceptives. This privacy right is 
then extended by Roe to the consequences of that sexual activity, either 
when contraceptives fail or indeed , when no contraceptives were used. The 
privacy right remains even then, so that a woman has an unfettered right 
almost throughout gestation, to destroy incipient life which came into 
existence by the exercise of that privacy right. The logic of the two cases of 
Eisenstadt and Roe seems indisputable. 
Right Extended 
This right has now been extended into a positive dimension with the 
introduction of new reproductive techniques. By that I mean that 
heretofore, the argument of the courts and commentators around 
Eisenstadt and Roe has been negat ive. That is, the individual has the right 
to avoid (by the privacy right guaranteed to each individual by the 
Constitution) the consequences of personal sexual activity (contraception, 
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abortion). The new reproductive methods have now permitted that same 
individual to constitutionally claim a positive right, that is, the right to have a 
child as an individual, whether married or not. The implication is that each 
individual has, as equal protection, equal access to these reproductive 
techniques whether that individual is married or not. The regulations of 
various sperm banks and reproductive clinics restricting its services to quasi 
sterile couples, may well be an unconstitutional infringement on the 
individual's positive right to beget a child under Eisenstadt. 
Many clinics have already gone beyond such strictures. Already there is 
a significant trend among certain "women's clinics" to make donor sperm 
available to any woman who presents herself, whether married or not. 
Already, a significant group of women have made the logical connection 
with the philosophy of Eisenstadt and have simply chosen artificial 
insemination to have their children without husbands or live-in 
boyfriends. Such a choice seems to be amply and constitutionally justified 
by Eisenstadt as the above analysis will attest. Yet, this view of the 
relationship of man-woman is disturbing. In fact , it puts into question the 
whole notion of paternity-maternity, marriage, family, man-woman 
relationship , which has not happened before in the history of our 
society. 
Such is the consequence of the philosophy of the Eisenstadt decision. It 
revolves around the notions of individual freedom and protection of his or 
her rights by government (or court decree) . The decision clearly 
implements a positive right of the individual- whether married or single -
to have and beget a child. It guarantees to each individual the right not just 
to avoid the begetting of a child, but the positive right to beget a child. 
This seems to be an expansive right, at first glance. It seems to expand 
rights given to the unmarried , the handicapped, aliens , illegitimates, 
gender, homosexuals - and a whole other group of people traditionally 
discriminated against in traditional society. While the 1973 decision of 
Roe has met with fierce resistance and has not abated , the fact is that, as we 
have seen, Roe rises or falls with the philosophy of EisenstaJ t because both 
cases are cut of the same piece of cloth. 
Implications of Eisenstadt 
Eisenstadt implies the right ofthe individual, every individual, to beget, 
to give life by choosing those means by which to give life. If I have a 
constitutional right to choose to have or not to have a child , by 
implication, I have the right to the means necessary to produce that right -
or the right itself becomes an empty promise. It seems clear, at least to me, 
that Eisenstadt implies that right of access of every individual to the 
artificial modern techniques of reproduction presently available only to 
certain quasi-sterile couples, heterosexual or homosexual. 
This right which flows from Eisenstadt is independent of matrimonial 
status and of every relation to a sexual partner, according to the 
preferences of the individual. This right is exercised in the name of privacy 
of the individual who alone has an absolute privacy right to determine his 
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or her own begetting power. This in turn implies for society an obligation-
duty to help the individual attain this right. While such a duty will not be 
constitutionally extended to financial help (the court has made it clear that 
the state has no positive duty to fund , e.g. , non-therapeutic abortions) , it 
can be extended to strike down all institutional barriers and prohibitions 
of access by single individuals to these new reproductive techniques . In a 
certain true sense, each individual has an inherent right to those sexual 
cells (e.g., sperm, ova) which will permit him or her to exercise this right of 
individual choice to beget - independent of any relationship with 
someone of the opposite sex. This would clearly be the case for sperm 
banks for unmarried as well as married women, as well as the newer 
reproductive technique of in vitro fertilization. For men, the application of 
the right would be more difficult because it implies the voluntary 
cooperation of a woman acting as a surrogate mother. This poses special 
problems of law reform concerning adoption, contracts, "payments-child 
selling" and other problems. Already, model legislation is being proposed 
in many jurisdictions concerning these problems for men in a surrogate 
situation. 
But for many women, there are no such problems. In fact , a significant 
number of women are already exercising this right given in Eisenstadt as 
single mothers ab initio (from the very beginning). The only thing that 
matters here is the positive desire of the individual to have a child . 
Such is the logical result of Eisenstadt's philosophy of individual right of 
privacy and procreation. Logically, it must, as a right which inheres in the 
individual, apply to both men and women, the married and the unmarried, 
homosexuals and heterosexuals. 
II 
Our first observation is the almost absolute character of the right of the 
individual in the area of procreation. Nowhere in any 0 these cases is there 
any mention of societal responsibility or above all , of the child to be born 
of this absolute choice of the individual. This should be seen in the light of 
the right to an abortion. Initially, there can be no real appeal to the rights 
of a child because he-she has no formal-legal rights under Roe until he-she 
is born. Since it can be aborted at almost anytime during gestation, it is 
useless to speak of bringing the interests of the child into the amalgam of 
individual choice. Society itself seldom intervenes in such a choice, even 
when the individual is an alcoholic or has defective genes. There has been 
some talk of intervention in these areas but so far, the only times courts 
have intervened is when the person is hopelessly insane or retarded and 
then only with the severest procedural safeguards (e.g., In re Grady ). As to 
the child , society will intervene only after birth in cases of neglect, 
abuse or abandonment. In other words , society will intervene only when it 
absolutely has to intervene. More intervention would tend to endanger 
family life and the penumbra of rightful privacy surrounding the family 
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and its independence. This is indispensable if we are to avoid the state 
totalitarianism so much in evidence in the Eastern bloc countries. 
But isn't it better for a child to be born wanted by a woman who 
consciously and lovingly conceives such a child for its own sake? Isn't such 
a situation better than what so often happens in "normal" families, among 
traditional couples where, in fact, so much child abuse factually takes 
place? Would this not , in fact , cut down on actual child abuse? This 
argument is often heard and it is mostly a "pro-child" type of argument. 
One must, of course, have a certain distrust of such an argument , coming 
as it does from a society which kills almost two million of these unborn 
children each year. 
Argument Deserves Consideration 
But the argument deserves some consideration. In fact , the child gets the 
short shrift in the arguments about the new reproductive techniques. What 
is emphasized is the right of the individual or of the couple to have a child 
- irrespective of its effects on the child and its future . In our laudable 
endeavor to help infertile couples and fertile single (sometimes lesbian) 
women achieve motherhood, we have neglected the child. In reality, 
motherhood and fatherhood exist for the child , not vice-versa and it 
perverts the argument to lay undue emphasis on individual rights. In this 
area, the purpose of reproduction is not and cannot be individual 
fulfillment or even rights. Such rights exist for a further end: the existence 
and well being of the child who has the infinite dignity of person to be 
respected for himself. Already, the inordinate emphasis of Eisenstadt on 
the absolute right of the individual to choose in this area of privacy is not 
absolute; this right must be weighed in function of a further morally good 
end - the good and the dignity of the child which is the fulfillment of 
motherhood-fatherhood. We must not reverse these ends. In this sense, 
there is an inseparable solidarity of man and woman vis-a-vis the child they 
bring into existence. The reason is quite simple and traditiqnal: the child 
has need of masculine and feminine role models equally shared by a 
mother and a father. We have come too far in psychiatric knowledge and 
experience to deny this elementary necessity of child development. This 
alone would seem to negate any legal approbation of the new reproductive 
techniques utilized for single parents ab initio. 
It is quite true that society cannot guarantee to each child the right to 
know and to have two parents and to be raised by them both together. But 
it can certainly legally demand and guarantee such conditions when it 
approves the licensing of clinics which perform new reproductive 
technologies or sperm banks. Society has every right by law to see to it 
that such technologies are applied to married couples and not to single 
individuals of either sex. Society may refuse to recognize any contract 
involving surrogate motherhood as a matter of public policy. Such public 
policy considerations would be based on the needs of any present or future 
child , as we have outlined , who need supra. In fact , such a policy may well 
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be compelling even if it were to be held that via Eisenstadt, every individual 
has a constitutional right to decide to beget a child. The parens patriae 
power of the state would most probably overcome any invocation of 
private constitutional right in this area. Every politician and legislator 
should seriously consider the symbolic and material import of these 
decisions on the type offuture society he or she will want to bring about via 
such legislation. 
Eisenstadt has impliedly (and now factually) given us the beginning of a 
society which is profoundly individualistic in the area of sexuality and 
procreation. These intimate areas of human life are no longer considered 
the privileged place for the inter-relationship of man and woman where 
they meet in mutual responsibility for an essential task vital for the future 
of any society - but as the prerogative of isolated individuals. Man and 
woman in Eisenstadt are reduced to individuals, literally disconnected 
from the tissue of human relationships which factually sustain individuals. 
Its philosophy completely ignores this vital human inter-relatedness and 
becomes reductionist. It is impossible to reconcile Eisenstadt with societal 
solidarity as well as with the solidarity of man-woman with the child. 
Eisenstadt can only result in human disaster for all concerned. 
The illusory dimension of sexual and procreational individualism as 
espoused by Eisenstadt lies in the fact that quite simply each human being 
does not have total power over his procreation but is related essentially to 
the other, man or woman. To separate the inseparable is to do violence to 
the relationship and finally to the individual himself in whose name 
individualism was first invoked. Recourse to the new reproductive 
technologies cannot remake human relatedness. 
To speak of an individual's right to procreate (or not) makes no human 
sense. I n this sense, separating procreation from traditional man-woman 
relationship and responsibility is not only to denaturalize the relationship 
but to destroy that which is the foundation of any healthy child-rearing 
product, not of technology but of human relatedness. ~ 0 replace the latter 
with the former is to regress and is not a true "progress in science." There 
are certain forms of sterility (e.g., the single state) which have no human 
solution either for the individual or for the prospective child. They must 
accept this suffering of alone-ness because its solution would only result in 
far greater social and individual harm which no society can accept. 
This is a hard saying for a society taught to reach out and "have it all." In 
fact , there are certain things we cannot have and still remain properly 
human. One ofthem is planned single parenthood which is destructive for 
the individuals who do it and the children they bring into the world. 
Society has a serious and compelling interest in forbidding this recent 
phenomenon, as destructive of societal and individual good. The 
philosophical implications of Eisenstadt must be curtailed by law. 
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